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PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported to oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah

Code

Ann.

Section

76-6-404

(1953

as

amended)

provides:
76-6-404.
Theft--elements.-A person
commits
theft
is he
obtains
or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another
with the purpose to deprive him.thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (l)(d) (1953 as amended)
provides:
76-6-412. Theft -- Classification of offenses -Action for treble damages against receiver of
stolen property.
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable: . . .
(d)
as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was $100 or less.

iv

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is the decision of the Court of Appeals that the

warrantless search of Iir. Hunter's dormitory room did not violate
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution in conflict with
this Court's decision in State v. Larocco?

2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to find that

Gregory Hunter enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
dormitory room?

3.

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the

search of Mr. Hunter's dormitory room was a reasonable exercise of
the university's responsibility and authority?

4.

Did the Court of Appeals err in not finding that the

participation of a university police officer in the search of Mr.
Hunter's

dormitory

room

mandated

compliance

with

the

warrant

requirements of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 4 of
the Utah Constitution?

5.

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Mr.

Hunter waived his waived his Fourth Amendment rights by his signing
of the university housing contract?

6.

Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that Mr.

Hunter was given reasonable notice of the university search?
v

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GREGORY T. HUNTER,
Petitioner/Defendant,
Priority No. 11
Case No. 910319-CA

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Plaint 1ff,
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaint iff/Appellant r
v,
GREGORY T. HUNTER,
Defendant/Appellee.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Court ot Appeals in State v. Hunter,
185 Ut. Adv. R. 13 (1992) is attached as Appendix A to this
petition. The trial courts finding of fact and order are attached
hereto as appendix B.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on April 21,
1992 (Appendix A ) .

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari

is

therefore filed timely with this court pursuant to Rule 48 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

This court has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2 (5) (1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of the Proceedings Below.

Defendant Gregory T. Hunter was charged with theft, a
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section
76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1)(d), (1990) (R.l).

The allegedly stolen

items had been found in his dormitory room at Utah State University
by university officials and police (T.35.38 and 39).

Following the

seizure of those items, defendant allegedly confessed the theft to
university police (T. 40 and 43).
Defendant

filed a pre-trial

motion to suppress the

items and his unrecorded

alleged

against

The

him

(R.

145).

confession

trial

court

from

seized

the evidence

granted

the

motion

(R.22,23).

The State of Utah then petitioned the Utah Court of

Appeals

take

to

an

suppression (R.15).
June

26,

1991.

interlocutory

appeal

from

the

order

of

The Court of Appeals granted the petition on

The

Court

of Appeals

reversed

the

order

of

suppression entered by the trial court.
The

Court

of

Appeals

held

that

the

warrantless

search

undertaken by University officials and police was reasonable and
therefore did not violate defendant's constitutional protections as
embodied

in the Fourth Amendment

Article I, Section

to the U.S. Constitution

14 of the Utah Constitution.

Appeals held that the evidence seized

and

The Court of

in defendant's

apartment

could properly be admitted against him in his trial for theft.
The Court

of Appeals, based on

its holding

regarding

the

reasonableness of the search did not reach the issue of whether or
not

defendant's

unrecorded

alleged

suppressed by the trial court.

confession

was

properly

Mr. Hunter seeks review of the

2

decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of
the university search under the U.S. and Utah Constitutions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The trial court found the following statement of facts
(R. 24-26) which were substantially

adopted by the Court of

Appeals.
1.

Defendant

is a student at Utah State University and was

residing on campus at 227 Mountain View Towers on April 4,
1991.
2.

The Defendant signed a resident hall contract which was received

in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit

1.

Paragraph

fifteen and sixteen of said contract read as follows (R. 131):
15.

ENTRY TO STUDENT ROOMS

University officials reserve the right to enter and inspect
residence hall rooms at any time. Inspections will occur when
necessary to protect and maintain the property of the
University, the health and safety of its students, or whenever
necessary to aid in the basic responsibility of the University
regarding discipline and maintenance of an education
atmosphere. In such cases effort will be made to notify the
resident(s) in advance and to have the resident(s) present at
the time of entry.
16.

ROOM CHECKS

University officials reserve the right to enter student rooms
or apartments for the purpose of room checks and repairs.
Room checks will take place each quarter in each residence
hall. Room checks are conducted to check for the following:
(1) fire or safety hazards, (2) cleanliness of apartment or
room, (3) maintenance problems, (4) occupancy, and (5)
inventory of equipment and furnishings.
If housekeeping
standards are not met within a specified period of time a
cleaning charge of $15 per hour will be assessed to the
resident(s) . Failure to adequately clean room and/or apartment
3

will also result in disciplinary action.
Defendant by signing said agreement acknowledges he had read
and

agreed

to

comply

with

the

terms

and

conditions

of

occupancy issued by housing office.
3.

The State presented

evidence

that

because of

reoccurring

vandalism, damage, and other problems occurring on the second
floor of Mountain View Towers in mid-March 1991, University
officials met with residents of said floor and told them that
if problems did not cease, room to room inspections would be
conducted as expressly authorized by the terms and conditions
of occupancy agreement.

Defendant was personally present at

this meeting.
4.

On the morning of April

4, 1991, Director of Housing, Gary

Smith, discovered that additional problems had occurred the
night before on the second floor of the Mountain View tower
dormitory. After he had investigated and confirmed the latest
damage, Director Smith decided to conduct the room-to-room
inspection of which the residents had been notified some two
weeks before.
football

He requested that'the University Police and the

coach

accompany

the

housing

officials

on

the

inspection.
5.

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 4, 1991, the University
officials began a room-to-room inspection on the second floor
of the Mountain View Tower

dormitory.

At

each room, the

University officials identified themselves.

If an occupant

was present, he let them in to inspect; if no one was present,
4

a pass key was used to gain entrance for the inspection.
6.

When the University officials arrived at room 207, no one was
present, so the housing officials entered with a pass key.
Upon

entry,

Director

Smith

could

see

stolen

property

University sign and a banner), in plain view.

(a

At Director

Smith's request, the University Police took those items into
custody.

(The trial court transcript

indicated that it was

the police who observed and seized the evidence [T. 31, 32,
35].) The inspection process then continued, until all thirty
(30) rooms on the second floor had been inspected.
7.

Approximately

an hour

later, the defendant

came

into the

office of the University Police, complaining about the items
which had been seized by the housing officials.

The police

then advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights, even though
he was neither under arrest nor in custody.

The Defendant

expressly v/aived those rights, and then voluntarily confessed
to the theft of stolen the University sign and banner found in
his room.
ARGUMENT
POINT I . A WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO AND SEARCH OF
GREGORY HUNTER'S DORMITORY ROOM IS IN CONFLICT WITH
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN STATE V. LAR0CC0.
The Court of Appeals found that the search of Hunter's
dormitory room was reasonable and therefore constitutional.

This

finding relied on an interpretation which significantly diminished
the constitutionally

mandated search

requirements set

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
5

forth

in

This court noted in Larocco that law in the area of
search and seizure was confused and inconsistent.

Based on that

observation, this court determined to articulate a ciear standard
by which the reasonableness of a search could be judged.

The

standard was grounded in the concept of a defendant's expectation
of privacy.

If the expectation of privacy threshold

is met,

Article lf Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, applies.
Article 1, Section

If

14 applies, "warrant less searches will be

permitted only where they satisfy their traditional justification,
namely, to protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent
the

destruction

of

evidence."

Id.

at

469-470;

see

also

Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272 A.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1970) ("[t]he
test to be used in determining the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment protections is whether or not the particular locale is
one 'in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion'") ci ting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364,
88 S. Ct. 2120, 20 L. Ed.2d 1154 (1968).
The Court of Appeals was correct in its observation that
this case

is one of

first impression

in the State of Utah.

However, authority from other jurisdictions holds that in the
context of university searches of dormitory rooms, the expectation
of privacy threshold is the starting point from which to judge the
reasonableness of university action.
supra;

Commonwealth v. McCloskey,

Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp.

777

(W.D. Mich. 1975);

Piazzoia v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Morale v.
Grigel , 422 F.Supp. 988 (D. New Hamp. 1976); Delgado, Col lege
6

Searches and Seizures; Students, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment,
26 Hastings L.J. 57 (1974); 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.11
(c), at 47-468 (2d ed. 1987).
a.

HUNTER ENJOYED A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HIS DORMITORY ROOM.

The Court of Appeals does not specifically find nor
address

the

expectation.

existence
The

university's duty

or

extent

court

instead

to provide

of

Mr.

finds

Hunter's

that

based

a clean, safe, weil

privacy
on

the

disciplined

environment in its dormitories the university was free to rake
"whatever reasonable measures are necessary."
Ut. Adv. R. 13 at 15 (1992).
requirement

State v. Hunter, 185

However, establisnmg the threshold

of an expectation

of privacy

is essential

to an

analysis of whether the university action was in fact reasonable.
Commonwealth v. HcClosKey, supra;

Piazzola v. Watkins, supra.

As

noted by previous courts addressing the issue; "reasonableness"
involves testing "the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails."

Morale v. Grigel, 422 F.Supp. 988 (D. New Hamp.

1976) .
"A dormitory room is a student's home away from home, and
any student may reasonably expect that once the door is closed to
the outside, his or her solitude and secrecy will not be destroyed
by a governmental intrusion without at least permission, if not
invitation.

The

guarantees this."
(1967);

Fourth

Amendment

right

by

its very

terms

Id. at 997; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

Piazzola v. Watkins, supra;

Smyth v. Lubbers,

People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968).
7

supra;

For ail practical purposes Hunter's dorm room v/as his
home and he had "the same interest in the privacy of his room as
any adult has in the privacy of his home, dwelling or lodging."
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp. at 786.

Once this privacy interest

is established, Larocco requires a warrant or a show of exigent
circumstances

and

supra.

McCloskey,

probable
The

cause.

only way

the

see

also

University

Commonwealth
may

avoid

v.
this

mandate is by exempting its action from traditional constitutional
scrutiny.
b.

THE UNIVERSITY'S SEARCH WAS NOT THE TYPE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH UHICH HAY BE CONDUCTED
ABSENT PROBABLE CAUSE AND A WARRANT.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the view that
USU's search v/as conducted pursuant to the University housing
contract and was permissible based on the University's
responsibility for maintaining order and discipline.

In support

of this analysis, the Court quotes extensively from Moore v.
Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D.
Ala. 1968).

The Moore court held that a warrantless search of

student dormitory rooms in search of drugs was not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. The Moore court found this to be so based
on the "special relationship" between college students who reside
in dormitories and the college.

The Moore case held that if "the action of the college
authorities—is necessary in aid of the basic responsibility of
the institution regarding discipline and maintenance of an
'educational atmosphere,' then it will be presumed facially
8

reasonable despite the fact that it may infringe to some extent
on the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights of students."
Id. at 729;

Utah v. Hunter, 185 Ut. Adv. R. atl4.

The analysis of the Moore decision has been questioned.
4 w. LaFave, Search and Seizure,
1987);

Smyth v. Lubbers, supra;

§10.11 (c), at 65-67 (2d. ed.
People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S. 2d

706 (1968); Commonwealth v. McCloskey,

supra.

In Smyth the college attempted to justify its search of
defendant's room arguing that the search regulation was essential
to the maintenance of order and discipline on campus and that the
search conducted pursuant to university regulations was
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

"The

theory is that the special characteristics of the college defeat
or seriously qualify whatever expectation of privacy the student
might have in other contexts or vis-a-vis other social
institutions."

Id. at 789.

The Smyth court flatly rejected "the theory that
college officials acting pursuant to regulations may infringe on
the outer limits of an adult's constitutional rights . . . [t]he
Fourth Amendment is flexible enough to meet a variety of public
needs, but it will not admit a slight infringement."

Id. at 789.

According to the Smyth court based on the defendant's clear
privacy interest in his room, the facts were not at the "outer
limits" but at the core of the Fourth Amendment.

Such a core

right may not be infringed based on "conclusory statements about
the college's need for order and discipline". . . Id.
9

A means

employed by the university "must be consistent with
constitutional limitations."

Id.

State v. Kappesf 6 Ariz. App. 567, 550 P. 2d 121,
(1976), relied on by the Court of Appeals is inapposite.

The

initial search in Kappes was conducted by school officials
pursuant to an express provision of the housing regulations which
provided that the University "could enter a dormitory room to
inspect for cleanliness, safety, or the need for repairs."
at 122.

Id.

Notice of the room inspection was posted twenty-four

(24) hours beforehand. Id. There is no contention that the search
in Kappes was for any purpose other than that expressly
articulated in the regulation.

It was only after the University

housing officials saw marijuana butts and a pipe in plain view on
defendant's desk that they contacted law enforcement officials
who conducted a second search.

Id. at 123.

The court in Kappes specifically notes this distinction
stating:
other courts have held that if a lav; enforcement official
initiated the investigation and, then gained entry to a
student's room without a warrant, everything seized thereby
would be barred under the Forth Amendment. . . [t]he same
result has followed where the entry is made by a school
official who does so at the request of, or in cooperation
with, law enforcement officials . . . [b]ut where the entry
is made by a student advisor conducting a routine dormitory
inspection announced in advance, we cannot say that the
intrusion is the result of government action which will
invoke the Fourth Amendment, and, consequently, the
exclusionary rule. citations omitted, Id. at 123-24.
The search of Iir. Hunter's dormitory room was not
routine nor administrative.

Facts found by the trial court

established that USU officials and a campus police officer

10

undertook the dormitory search based on "vandalism, damage and
other problems" which apparently had occurred occasionally and on
the night before the search in question.

The facts demonstrate

that the search was conducted specifically to discover evidence
linking residents of the second floor of the dormitory to
activities which Utah lav/ makes illegal.

Furthermore, university

regulations specifically prohibit the possession of alcohol and
firearms and the record and opinion at the Court of Appeals note
that alcohol and firearms or explosives were also sought related
to the damage and vandalism.
Under these circumstances Xappes is plainly
distinguishable.

Furthermore, as noted by one commentator, if a

university search purportedly made for the purpose of responding
to an emergency situation uncovers "evidence leading to either a
criminal prosecution or disciplinary action. . . then certainly
'official motives must undergo scrutiny.'"

4 W. LaFave, Search

and Seizure §10.11 (c), at 469 (2d. ed. 1987); Armstrong, Col lege
Search and Seizures: Privacy and Due Process Problems on Campus,
5 Crim. L. Bui . 537 ( 1969) .
C.

THE PARTICIPATION OF A UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
POLICE OFFICER MANDATES STRICT COMPLIANCE
WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION
14 PROTECTIONS.

The Court of Appeals granted broad iatitude to the
university and treated as minor the involvement of USU Police
Officer Steven Milne.

However, Officer Milne's participation

required, if anything, a stricter conformance with the warrant
protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of
11

the Utah Constitution.
The alleged 3ustification for desiring the
participation of Officer m i n e in the search in addition to
involvement of USU Director of Housing, Gary Smith, the head
custodian and a USU football coach was "solely for the purpose of
providing assistance in the event that Smith discovered any
problems that he was not able to handle on his own."
Hunter, 185 Ut. Adv. R. at 13.

Utah v.

What problems Smith contemplated

that three adult men with official university credentials could
not handle is unclear and irrelevant.

The participation of

Officer Ililne mandated, without question, adherence to
constitutional standards.

"When a law enforcement officer

directs, participates or acquiesces m

a search conducted by

private parties, that search must comport with usual
constitutional standards.

(emphasis added) II.J. v. State of

Florida, 399 So.2d 996 (Ct. App. Fla. 1981).

The 11.J. court

additionally notes that "where a law enforcement officer directs,
participates, or acquiesces in a search conducted by school
officials, the officer must have probable cause for that search,
even though the school officials acting alone are treated as
state officials subject to a lesser constitutional standard for
conducting these searches in light of the in
doctrine.
the in

loco

loco

parentis

The M.J, case concerned a high school student and thus
parentis

doctrine may have been applicable.

In this

case, of course, no such doctrine is available to or asserted by
the State.

Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.

12

284 F.Supp. at 729.

The involvement of campus police officers :n

Smyth persuaded that court to reiterate the application of the
Fourth Amendment to the search.

Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp.

at 787.
d.

THE UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY HOUSING CONTRACT SIGNED
BY HUNTER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS NOR OPERATE AS CONSENT
TO THE SEARCH BY UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS.

The Court cf Appeals held that "by signing the
aforementioned housing contract. Hunter agreed to the
university's right of reasonaole inspection and waived any Fourth
Amendment objections to the university's exercise of thar right."
Id. at 15.

The Court of Appeals' holding again rests on a view

that the university searcn was reasonable under ~he
circumstances.

However, this analysis offers such wide latitude

to the university that virtually any search asserted as necessary
by university officials would be de facto reasonable.
Surely Hunter did not contemplate a warrantless search
of his dormitory room without reasonable notice and subsequent
criminal prosecution.

Even in Moore, the court founc tnat the

right of school authorities to search must be basec on a
reasonable belief on the part of college autnorities "that a
student is using a dormitory room for a purpose which is illegal
or which would otherwise seriously interfere with campus
discipline."

Hoore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.f

284 F. Supp. at 730.
The State alleged on appeal and the Court of Appeals
apparently agreed that a generalized threat to searcn made some
13

tv/o weeks prior to the actual search of the dormitory rooms
constituted sufficient notice.

However, a generalized notice

couched in terms of an ambiguous threat to search made some tv/o
weeks prior to the actual search cannot be said under thoughtful
analysis to truly be notice.
There is no evidence that Hunter particularly was
suspected of any illegal activity and no evidence was found of
his participation in the vandalism, alcohol use or explosives
possession.

It is important to point out that the defendant in

Moore was not facing criminal prosecution but only college
disciplinary proceedings.

This was important in that court's

analysis for it noted "that cue process in college disciplinary
proceedings does not require full blown adversary hearings
subject to Rules of Evidence and all constitutional criminal
guarantees." Id. at 730; see also

Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 272

A.2d at 274 (finding that Moore did not apply because it did not
involve criminal prosecution).

Thus, even presuming Moore is

credible law, its teaching is that because college disciplinary
proceedings are not criminal proceedings the standard required of
college authorities to justify a search is lower than the
constitutional protection in criminal cases of "probable cause."
Id.

Of course, Mr. Hunter is the subject of a criminal

prosecution for theft.
Greg Hunter sought housing on the campus of usu for any
one of a number of reasons.

His decision to seek housing on

campus and to enter into the boiler plate housing contract
14

drafted by the university should not now be argued to demonstrate
that Mr. Hunter either waived constitutional protection or
consented to warrantless searches of his room for the purpose of
discovering conduct or evidence which would indicate a violation
of university policy or State law.

"[A] blanket authorization in

an adhesion contract that the [university] may search the room
for violation of whatever substantive regulations the
[university] chooses to adopt and pursuant to whatever search
regulation the [university] chooses to adopt is not the type of
focused, deliberate, and immediate consent contemplated by the
Constitution." Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. at 788.
The fact that Hunter signed a contract generally giving the
university the right to inspect his dormitory room did not confer
an absolute right to the university.

"A student who has a

college as a landlord is not in a significantly different
position from a student who lives off campus in a boarding
house." 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.6(c),
1987)

at 778 (2d. ed.

"The latter is quite obviously protected by the Supreme

Court ruling in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 81 S.Ct.
776, 5 L.Ed 2d 828 (1961) that a landlord may not consent to a
police search of his tenant's quarters merely because he has some
right of entry of his own in connection with his position as
landlord." LaFave at 778.

Of course this does not mean that

university officials are not entitled to enter a dormitory room
absent probable cause.
"It must be remembered that there does exist a

15

landlord-tenant relationship between the university and the
student.

While, consistent with the decided Fourth Amendment

cases, this does not mean that the university-as-landlord can
enter to find evidence of crime or can give consent to a police
search which will be effective against the tenant, it has been
recognized that a landlord may enter for certain purposes, such
as to view waste or to make repairs.

There is no reason why this

should not be equally true of the university-landlord."
citations omitted W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.II, at 468.
POINT II. A WARRANT WAS REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE
SEARCH OF HUNTER'S DORMITORY ROOM BY UTAH STATE
UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS.
If university officials suspected certain dormitory
residents of improper activities the evidence of their probable
cause should have been taken to a court and a warrant sought.
"Securing a warrant to search a student's room, whether from a
civil magistrate or from the College Judiciary, means some
inconvenience to the college officials.

However, this is not an

inconvenience to be weighed against the claims of administrative
efficiency . . . and is an inconvenience justified in a free
society to protect the constitutional value of privacy which
adults who happen to be students share equally with other
citizens."
793.

citations omitted, Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. at

The Smyth court goes on to note that the securing of a

search warrant in advance may hold important collateral benefits
to the university.

In this case, the ambiguity surrounding the

necessity of the search, the reasons for the search, and the
16

specific objectives intended to be met by the search may well
have been answered :f the university had been required, in
advance, to lustify to the court through a probabie cause
affidavit the need for the search.

"A prior affidavit and a

v/arrant ouild a record, establish the presumptive validity of the
search, and minimize the burden of justification in post search
hearings." Id.
In this case there is no allegation that the police or
university officials were in danger, that Hunter would flee, or
that the evidence found in his room would be destroyed.

In the

absence of these exigent circumstances the securing of a warrant
is required.

State v. Larocco, supra.

As previously noted by

this court, it would have required no great effort to secure such
a warrant and protect the rights of Mr. Hunter.
("in

State v. Larocco

light of ease with which warrants can be obtained under

Utah's telephonic v/arrant statute" there is "no persuasive reason
why the officer cannot take time to secure a warrant) 794 P.2d at
470.
CONCLUSION
The evidence found by university officials and the
university police officer was properly suppressed by the trial
court.

This Court has held that the "exclusion of legally

obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations
of Article I, Section 14.

State v Larocco, at 472. Such a result

is also required by the Fourth Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
17

The decision of the

Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with existing law and the
weight of authority on this significant constitutional issue.
Based on the important issues involved in this case and the split
of authority in various jurisdictions, this Court's guidance on
this issue is critical.

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Hunter

respectfully requests that this petition for writ of certiorari
be granted and that this court review each of the issues
addressed.

Dated this

^'

of May, 1992.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I hand delivered ten (10) copies of the foregoing
to the Utah Supreme Court, Salt Lake City, Utah, and four (4)
copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Dated this

/_\Jr

of May, 1992
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RUSSON, Judge:
The State of Utah filed this interlocutory appeal from an
order granting defendant Gregory T. Hunter's motion to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of his
dormitory room by a Utah State University official. We reverse
and remand.
FACTS
On April 4, 1991, Gregory T. Hunter was charged with theft,
a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann, §§ 76-6-404
and -412(1)(d) (1990),l following the seizure of stolen
university property from his dormitory room and his subsequent
confession to theft of those items.

1. Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-404 (1990) enumerates the elements of
theft; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(d) (1990) provides that if
the value of the property stolen is $100 or less, then theft of
such constitutes a class B misdemeanor.

During the Spring of 1991, Hunter was a student at Utah
State University in Logan, Utah and resided in Room 2 07 of
Mountain View Towers, a campus dormitory. All of the students
who lived in university-provided housing were required to sign a
residence hall contract, which included the following provisions:
13. HOUSING REGULATIONS. Students are
required to abide by University and
University Housing regulations as outlined in
University publications, as well as such
rules of conduct as have been adopted by the
student organization of the hall in which
they reside. . . . Housing regulations
include, but are not limited to, the
following:
a) Utah state law prohibits the possession
and/or consumption of all alcoholic beverages
or the possession of alcoholic beverage
containers in the residence halls.

e) Firearms and explosives are absolutely
prohibited in all residents' rooms/apartments
at all times. . . .

15. ENTRY TO STUDENT ROOMS. University
officials reserve the right to enter and
inspect residence hall rooms at any time.
Inspections will occur when necessary to
protect and maintain the property of the
University, the health and safety of its
students, or whenever necessary to aid in the
basic responsibility of the University
regarding discipline and maintenance of an
educational atmosphere. In such cases effort
will be made to notify the resident(s) in
advance and to have the resident(s) present
at the time of entry.
In signing his contract, Hunter acknowledged that he had read and
agreed to comply with all of the terms and conditions outlined in
the residence hall contract.
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In early 1991, numerous incidents of vandalism, damage, and
other problems occurred on the second floor of Mountain View
Towers, which incidents university officials suspected were the
result of violations of the alcohol and explosives prohibitions.
In mid-March, university officials met with the residents of that
floor. Hunter was present during that meeting, at which the
residents were told that if the problems did not cease, room-toroom inspections would be conducted pursuant to the residence
hall contracts.
On the morning of April 4, 1991, Gary Smith, Director of
Housing and Food Services at Utah State University, received a
report that further problems and damage had occurred on the
second floor of Mountain View Towers. As a result of this
report, Smith decided to conduct a room-to-room inspection.
Without obtaining a search warrant, Smith began the inspection,
accompanied by the head custodian, a football coach, and Officer
Steven Milne, a university police officer. The presence of the
football coach was requested because a number of football team
members lived on the second floor of Mountain View Towers.
Officer Milne was called solely for the purpose of providing
assistance in the event that Smith discovered any problems that
he was not able to handle on his own.
The four men went from room to room, using the following
procedure: At each room, Smith knocked on the door, identified
himself to the occupant or occupants, and then conducted an
inspection of the room. If no occupant was present, Smith
admitted himself by using the head custodian's passkey, conducted
an inspection, and then exited the room. In the course of the
investigation, every room on the floor was inspected.
No one was present in Hunter's room, so Smith used the
passkey to gain entry. Upon entering the room, Smith saw stolen
university property, consisting of a sign and a banner, in plain
view in Hunter's room. At Smith's request, Officer Milne seized
these items.
Approximately one hour later, Hunter went to the university
police office to complain about the inspection and seizure of the
items from his room. At this point, although Hunter was neither
under arrest nor in custody, the university police advised Hunter
of his Miranda rights. Hunter expressly waived his Miranda
rights and confessed to the theft of the sign and the banner that
had been found in his room.
Subsequently, Hunter was charged with theft, a class B
misdemeanor. He filed a motion to suppress evidence of the sign
and banner found in his room, as well as his confession. The
trial court granted the motion, and the State filed this
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interlocutory appeal, raising the following issue: Did the trial
court err in determining that the warrantless entry of Hunter's
room, and seizure of property found therein, violated his
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures?2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact underlying its decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress must be upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. However, we review the trial court's legal
conclusions in regards thereto under a correction of error
standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991),
ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . ." U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphasis added). Thus,
the question before us is whether, in light of all of the facts
and circumstances, Smith's search of Hunter's room was
reasonable.
Since this is an issue of first impression in Utah, we look
to other jurisdictions for guidance. Our review of the cases
from jurisdictions that have considered this issue reveals a
split in authority among the various jurisdictions.3 Thus, we
adopt the more persuasive approach, which holds that in cases
such as the one at bar, n[t]he right of privacy protected by the
2. The State further argues that even if the warrantless search
did violate Hunter's constitutional rights, the trial court
nonetheless erred in suppressing Hunter's confession on the basis
that, but for the entry and seizure of the property, Hunter would
not have confessed to the theft. Because of our resolution of
the search issue, we need not address the State's argument on
this second issue.
3. Compare, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State
Univ. , 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); State v. Kappes, 26
Ariz. App. 567, 550 P.2d 121, 124 (1976); People v. Kelly, 195
Cal.App.2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961); People v. Haskins, 48
A.D.2d 480, 369 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1975) with Piazzola v. Watkins, 442
F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D.
Mich. 1975); Morale v. Gricrel, 422 F. Supp. 988, (D. N.H. 1976);
People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968).
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fourth amendment does not include freedom from reasonable
inspection of a school-operated dormitory room by school
officials." State v. Kappes, 26 Ariz. App. 567, 550 P.2d 121,
124 (1976) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct.
507 (1967)).
The court in Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State
Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968), outlined the reasoning
for adopting such an approach:
College students who reside in
dormitories have a special relationship with
the college involved. Insofar as the Fourth
Amendment affects that relationship, it does
not depend on either a general theory of the
right of privacy or on traditional property
concepts. The college does not stand,
strictly speaking, iri loco parentis to its
students, nor is their relationship purely
contractual in the traditional sense. The
relationship grows out of the peculiar and
sometimes the seemingly competing interests
of college and student. A student naturally
has the right to be free of unreasonable
search and seizures, and a tax-supported
public college may not compel a "waiver11 of
that right as a precedent to admission. The
college, on the other hand, has an
"affirmative obligation" to promulgate and
enforce reasonable regulations designed to
protect campus order and discipline and to
promote an environment consistent with the
educational process. The validity of the
regulation authorizing search of dormitories
thus does not depend on whether a student
"waives" his right to Fourth Amendment
protection or on whether he has "contracted"
it away; rather, its validity is determined
by whether the regulation is a reasonable '
exercise of the college's supervisory duty
In other words, if the regulation—or, in the
absence of a regulation, the action of the
college authorities—is necessary in aid of
the basic responsibility of the institution
regarding discipline and maintenance of an
"educational atmosphere," then it will be
presumed facially reasonable despite the fact
that it may infringe to some extent on the
outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights
of students.
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Id, at 729 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Moore court concluded
that the search was reasonable, likening it to a number of
Supreme Court cases in which searches had been found to be
permissible because they were "conducted by a superior charged
with a responsibility of maintaining discipline and order or of
maintaining security.11 Id. at 730-31 (citing United States v.
Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. Collins,
349 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. D o n a t e 269 F.
Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442, 449 (D. Del. 1966)).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has recognized that "where
state-operated educational institutions are involved, . . .
[there is a] x need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools.'" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 92 S. Ct.
2338, 2345-46 (1972) (quoting Tinker v. Pes Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 89 S. Ct. 733, 737
(1969)). Furthermore, even cases in those jurisdictions that
have held that such searches are illegal acknowledge that
universities have an interest in regulating student conduct.
See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971)
(universities retain broad supervisory powers to permit them to
adopt such regulations, so long as the regulation is reasonably
construed and limited in its application); Morale v. Grigel, 422
F. Supp. 988, 997 (D. N.H. 1976) (schools have a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on campus, as long as its
interests are limited by its function as an educational
institution).
Applying this law to the facts of our case, we conclude that
Smith's search was a reasonable exercise of the university's
authority to maintain an educational environment.
Students
attending a university require and are entitled to an atmosphere
that is conducive to educational pursuits. In a dormitory
situation, it is the university that accepts the responsibility
of providing this atmosphere. Thus, it is incumbent upon the
university to take whatever reasonable measures are necessary to
provide a clean, safe, well-disciplined environment in its
dormitories. Due to numerous incidents of vandalism, damage, and
other problems occurring on the second floor of Mountain View
Towers, which incidents were suspected to be the result of
violations of the alcohol and explosives prohibitions, university
officials had an interest in correcting the same in order to
maintain a proper educational environment. See Kappes, 550 P.2d
at 124.
Moreover, the housing contract between Hunter and Utah State
University offers further support for the determination that the
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search was reasonable. As part of Hunter's agreement to live in
university-provided housing, he was required to sign a residence
hall contract, the provisions of which included a prohibition
against the possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages or
the possession of alcoholic beverage containers in residence
halls and a prohibition against the possession of explosives in
all residents' rooms at all times. In order to enforce these
regulations, university officials reserved the right to enter and
inspect residence hall rooms at any time "to protect and maintain
the property of the University, the health and safety of its
students, or whenever necessary to aid in the basic
responsibility of the University regarding discipline and
maintenance of an educational atmosphere." By signing t^e
.•AfiaESSfe^^

Hnr^.P.r aay^ed to frhe

university's right of reasonable inspection and waived any Fourth
!SS^^
the u n a ^ ^ r ^ t ^
that rightr
Thus, given the fact that Hunter acknowledged the university's
right to inspect his room when he signed his housing contract,
and accepted the room on that condition, it can hardly be said
that the stolen university property seized in plain view had been
the subject of an unreasonable search. See Moore, 284 F. Supp.
at 729-31; Kappes, 550 P.2d at 124.
In fact, not only did university officials have a right to
maintain an educational atmosphere, they had a contractual duty
to do so. Paragraph 21 of the housing agreement provides the
basis of such duty:
21. AGREEMENT TO STUDENTS. For those
students who remain current on their
financial accounts and who abide by the above
stated Terms and Conditions of Occupancy,
Utah State University Housing agrees to
provide an environment which is clean, safe,
well maintained, and to promote an atmosphere
which is conducive to study and free of undue
disturbances.
Further support for the reasonableness of the search is
found in the fact that effort was made to notify the residents in
advance of the possibility of university officials pursuing such
a remedy* In mid-March, university officials met with the
residents of Hunter's floor, at which time the residents were
told that if the problems did not cease, room-to-room inspections
would be conducted pursuant to the residence hall contract.
Hunter was present during that meeting. It is clear that, under
the facts of this case, such notice was sufficient to alert
residents of the imminent possibility that such a search would be
undertaken. Additionally, since the search was conducted in
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mid-morning and Smith knocked on each door before entering, we
cannot say that the search was overly intrusive under the
circumstances of this case. Also, the fact that further problems
and damage were reported on the very morning of the room-to-room
search supports the conclusion that Smith's decision to search
was reasonable.
Lastly, it is important to distinguish what did not occur:
This is not a case in which university officials took action at
the behest of or as part of a joint investigation with the
police. Compare Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 286; Moore, 284 F. Supp.
at 727-28; People v. Kelly, 195 Cal.App.2d 669, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177
(1961); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706
(1968); Commonwealth v. McCloskeyf 217 Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d
271 (1970). Nor did university officials attempt to delegate
their right to inspect rooms to the police, which would result in
the circumvention of traditional restrictions on police activity.
Compare Piazzola, 442 F.2d at 286; Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 728;
Kelly, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 179; McCloskey, 272 A.2d at 272. In
light of the recurring troubles with vandalism and other damage
that had occurred on Hunter's floor, Smith alone made the
decision to conduct a room-to-room search for university
purposes, without any input from the university police. The sole
purpose of Officer Milne's presence was to provide assistance in
the event that Smith confronted problems he was not able to
handle on his own. Thus, no action was taken which would promote
circumvention of constitutional restrictions placed on police
action.
CONCLUSION
The search undertaken to protect the university's interest
in maintaining a safe and proper educational environment, as well
to fulfill the requirements of the housing contract, was
reasonable. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's
determination that evidence of the stolen property found in
Hunter's room should be suppressed. Additionally, since the
trial court's sole ground in suppressing Hunter's confession is
based on its erroneous determination that the stolen property
should be suppressed, that determination is also reversed. This
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matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

WE C

Regnal W. Garff, Judgef >•'

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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APPENDIX B

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff

]
]i
>
]

vs.
GREGORY T. HUNTER,
Defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CRIMINAL NO. 911000438

]

THE DEFENDANT having filed a Motion to suppress Evidence
upon the grounds of illegal seizure came on for hearing on May
7, 1991. Evidence was presented and arguments presented and
the parties having submitted written Memorandas. Based thereon
the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision:
FACTS
1.

2.

Defendant is a student at Utah State University and was
residing on campus at 227 Mountain View Towers on April 4,
199.
The Defendant signed a resident hall contract which was
received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit #1. Paragraph
fifteen and sixteen of said contract read as follows:
15.

ENTRY TO STUDENT ROOMS

University officials reserve the right to enter and
inspect residence hall rooms at any time. Inspections
will occur when necessary to protect and maintain the
property of the University, the health and safety of
its students, or whenever necessary to aid in the
basic responsibility of the University regarding
discipline
and
maintenance
of
an
educational
atmosphere.
In such cases effort will be made to
notify the resident(s) in advance and to have the
resident(s) present at the time of entry.
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16.

ROOM CHECKS

University officials reserve the right to enter
student rooms or apartments for the purpose of room
checks and repairs. Room checks will take place each
quarter in each residence hall.
Room checks are
conducted to check for the following: (1) fire or
safety hazards, (2) cleanliness of apartment or room,
(3) maintenance problems, (4) occupancy, and (5)
inventory
of
equipment
and
furnishings.
If
housekeeping standards are not met within a specified
period of time a cleaning charge of $15 per hour will
be assessed to the resident(s). Failure to adequately
clean room and/or apartment will also result in
disciplinary action.

3.

4.

Defendant by signing said agreement acknowledges he had
read and agreed to comply with the terms and conditions of
occupancy issued by housing office.
State presented evidence that because of reoccurring
vandalism, damage, and other problems occurring on the
second floor of Mount View Towers in mid March 1991,
University officials met with residents of said floor and
told them that if problems did not cease, room to room
inspections would be conducted as expressly authorized by
the terms and conditions of occupancy agreement. Defendant
was personally present at this meeting.
On the morning of April 4, 1991, Director of Housing, Gary
Smith, discovered that additional problems had occurred the
night before on the second floor of the Mountain View Tower
dormitory. After he had investigated and confirmed the
latest damage, Director Smith decided to conduct the
room-to-room inspection of which the residents had been
notified some two weeks before. He requested that the
University Police and the football coach accompany the
housing officials on the inspection.
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5.

At approximately 10:00 a.m. on April 4, 1991, the
University officials began a room-to-room inspection on the
second floor of the Mountain View Tower dormitory. At each
room, the University officials identified themselves. If
an occupant was present, he let them in to inspect; if no
one was present, a pass key was used to gain entrance for
the inspection.
6. When the University officials arrived at room 207, no one
was present, so the housing officials entered with a pass
key. Upon entry, Director Smith could see stolen property
(a University sign and a banner), in plain view.
At
Director Smith's request, the University Police took those
items into custody. The inspection process then continued,
until all thirty (30) rooms on the second floor had been
inspected.
7. Approximately an hour later, the defendant came into the
office of the University Police, complaining about the
items which had been seized by the housing officials. The
police then advised the Defendant of his Miranda rights,
even though he was neither under arrest nor in custody.
The Defendant expressing those rights, and then voluntarily
confessed to having stolen the University sign and banner
found in his room.
ISSUE PRESENTED

The Defendant argues that the foregoing search violated
Defendant's constitutional rights under Amendment II of the
United State Constitution and Section 1, Article 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
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ANALYSIS
The State cites the case of New Jersey vs. T, L, P., 469 US
325, 83 L ED 2d 720, 103 S Ct 733 (1985), for the proposition
that searches conducted by school officials such as this are
not required to obtain a search warrant to search a student's
room who is under their authority; since a student has a
reduced expectation of privacy on school campuses, and school
officials must swiftly deal with disciplinary problems in
school.
This case involved the search of a student's person where
marijuana was seized by a school official. The United States
Supreme Court in foot note 7 states:
We here consider only searches carried out
by school authorities acting alone and on
their own authority.
This case does not
present the question of the appropriate
standard for assessing the legality of
searches conducted by school officials in
conjunction with or at the behest of law
enforcement agencies, and we express no
opinion on that question.
The State further argues that the Utah Supreme Court has
not decided a school search issue under the Utah constitution
and therefore New Jersey vs. T. L. O. supercedes the cases
cited by Defendant including State vs. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460
(Utah 1990), which the State contends falls in the automobile
exception to a search warrant requirement under the Utah
Constitution.
The Court finds that the search in this case met the
reasonable test outlined in New Jersey vs. T. C. 0. were this
case to be decided under Federal law. However, this case
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falls under the Footnote 7 exception as noted above.
The Defendant also asserts his rights under the Utah
Constitution above mentioned were also violated by this search
by the school authorities and the University Police Department.
In State vs. Larocco, supra the Utah Supreme Court holds on
page 469 as follows:
Specifically, this court will continue to
use the concept of expectation of privacy as
a
suitable
threshold
criterion
for
determining whether Article I, Section 14
(Utah Constitution) is applicable. Then if
Article I, Section 14 applies, warrantless
searches will be permitted only where they
satisfy
their
traditional
justification,
namely, to protect the safety of police or
the public or to prevent the destruction of
evidence.
As Justice Durham cites with the approval of Justice
Zimmerman on the case of State vs Hugh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah
1985) and quotes on page 70 the following:
Once the threat that the suspect will injure
the officers with concealed weapons or will
destroy evidence is gone, there is no
persuasive reason why the officers cannot
take the time to secure a warrant. Such a
requirement would present little impediment
to police investigations, especially in
light of the ease with which warrants can be
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant
statute.
The Court finds that Defendant in this case certainly had
an expectation of privacy to his dormitory room. Rule 15 of
the residents hall contract allows university officials to
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enter and inspect the room at any time, violates the students
right of expectation of privacy and therefore State vs. Larocco
applies.
The Court finds the search made in this case violated the
Defendant's state constitutional rights as announced in State
vs. Larocco.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and
Confession is hereby granted. The Defendant's confession is
suppressed as part of the illegal search, and would not have
occurred but for the illegal search.
Dated this 21st day of May, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

-/w-

Burton H. Harris
Circuit Court Judge
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